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The Toronto Land Transfer Tax (LTT), implemented nearly a 
year ago, has had significant negative effects on the housing market,
reducing sales and lowering average house prices.
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URBAN ISSUESOn February 1, 2008, the City of Toronto imposed a Land Transfer Tax (LTT)
on the sale of real estate within its municipal boundaries. This LTT requires
that buyers pay a tax of about 1.1 percent on the purchase of a house in
Toronto. 
We assess the effects of the LTT on the volume of sales and on prices using data
on the sale of single-family homes in the Greater Toronto Area between January
2006 and August 2008. Our data show that the LTT caused a 16 percent
decline in the number of single-family homes sold after January 2008 and a 1.5
percent reduction in house values. We calculate that in its first year, the LTT
will cause a reduction in household mobility – at least 3,500 families in the
municipality of Toronto will stay in houses from which they would have
otherwise moved – and an average reduction in selling price of about $6,400
per house.
The reduction in household mobility means that families will be more likely to
remain in houses that are too big or too small, or are too far from their
workplace or school. The dollar value of this lost mobility is about $1 for every
$13 of revenue that the LTT generates for Toronto’s coffers, or about $12
million per year. We also find that the LTT has led to significant new
administrative expenses. 
While an LTT and an ordinary property tax have similar effects on property
prices, their effects differ otherwise. Unlike an LTT, an ordinary property tax
does not discourage mobility and does not involve the extra administrative
expenses associated with the LTT. More concretely, if Toronto raised property
tax rates by about 8 percent, then property owners would pay about the same
amount of tax as under the LTT. However, because an ordinary property tax
does not discourage mobility, they would pay these taxes on houses that suited
them better and would be relieved of the extra administrative expenses of the
LTT. It follows that the welfare of Toronto residents could be improved if the
city reduced its reliance on the LTT in favor of the preexisting property tax.
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N
ew taxes always generate 
controversy, and this holds
true for the City of Toronto’s
Municipal Land Transfer Tax (the
LTT). After a few months of debate in
late 2007, City Council voted to begin
collecting the tax in February 2008. 
Now, nearly a year after the tax was implemented, it
is possible to evaluate the impact of the tax on real
estate transactions and prices in Toronto, and to
reach conclusions about the desirability of using the
LTT as a source of municipal funding. 
The Toronto real estate market experienced a
decrease in both volume and average price after the
introduction of the LTT in 2008. (Figures 1a and 1b
show transaction volumes and prices for 2005
through 2008 both inside and outside the City of
Toronto.) It is tempting to attribute this decline
entirely to the LTT. However, transactions and
values also declined in the surrounding munici-
palities; thus, other forces were also at work. To
assess the desirability of the LTT as a source of
municipal funding, we must first correctly dis-
tinguish its effects from those of other factors
affecting real estate markets. 
To accomplish this, we restrict attention to real
estate transactions near the border of the muni-
cipality of Toronto, and compare changes in
transaction volumes and values in Toronto with the
changes in transaction volumes and values in
adjacent municipalities. After the LTT’s imposition,
transaction volumes and prices in Toronto dropped
relative to adjacent areas not subject to the LTT. 
More specifically, our analysis indicates that
Toronto’s LTT caused a 16 percent decrease in the
number of single-family home sales (excluding condo-
miniums and apartments). The decrease in transaction
volume appears to be larger for houses below average
value, and smaller for those above. Our analysis also
indicates that Toronto’s LTT caused an approximately
1.5 percent reduction in the average sale price of a
Toronto home. This amount is close to, or above, the
average LTT exaction. The decline in prices appears to
be larger for houses above average value, and smaller
for those below. Thus, while the LTT reduces the
wealth and mobility of all Toronto property owners, it
has a relatively larger effect on the mobility of the less
affluent and a relatively larger effect on the wealth of
the more affluent.
Both an LTT and an ordinary property tax are
expected to have similar effects on property prices.
However, unlike an LTT, an ordinary property tax
does not discourage mobility and does not involve
the extra administrative expenses of the LTT. More
concretely, if Toronto raised property tax rates by
about 8 to 10 percent, property owners would pay
about the same amount of tax as under the LTT. 
Nonetheless, because an ordinary property tax
does not discourage mobility, they would: (i) pay
these taxes on houses that suited them better; and
(ii) be relieved of the extra administrative expenses of
the LTT. It follows that the welfare of Toronto
residents could be improved if the city reduced its
reliance on the LTT in favor of the property tax
already in place, or increased user fees.
It is reasonable to expect that the effects of
Toronto’s LTT are similar to the effects of LTTs
imposed by the Province of Ontario and by other
provinces and municipalities. Thus, our analysis also
suggests that welfare improvements are possible if
these other governments decrease their reliance on
LTTs in favor of regular property taxes. Other
municipalities and provinces that currently levy
LTTs, or are considering doing so, should consider
an alternative tax to raise the equivalent funds.
The remainder of this paper is organized as
follows. The next section describes the LTTs in
Toronto and elsewhere. Section three addresses the
problem of estimating the effect of the LTT on
transaction volume. In section four, we calculate the
cost of lost mobility from the LTT. In section five,
we measure the effect of the LTT on the prices of
single-family homes and conclude with a policy
assessment of the LTT.
Background and Policy Context
Land transfer taxes are widely applied both in Canada
and abroad. Within Canada, the governments of
British Columbia, Manitoba, Ontario, Quebec, New
Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, and some Nova
Independent • Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
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Figure 1: Transactions and Prices of Real Estate in the City of Toronto and Surrounding Suburbs, 
Five Kilometres from Border of City of Toronto
A. Number of Transactions
Note: The dashed line in this figure shows the number of sales and the average price of a single-family house in a five-kilometre-wide band just outside the Toronto
border between January 2005 and August 2008. The solid line shows the corresponding graphs for the five-kilometre-wide band just inside the Toronto border.
There is a drop in Toronto house sales and prices that is not matched by a drop in nearby suburbs not subject to the LTT.
Sources: Multiple Listing Service; authors’ calculations.
B. Sale Price
LTT IN
EFFECTCity of Toronto  Province of Ontario
LTT Rate by Value (Effective Feb. 1, 2008) LTT Rate by Value (Effective May 7, 1997)
dollars percent dollars percent
0-55,000 0.5 0-55,000 0.5
55,000-400,000 1.0 55,000-250,000 1.0
400,000+ 2.0 250,000-400,000 1.5
400,000+ 2.0
Commentary 277 | 3
Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
Scotia municipalities impose a land transfer tax, while
the City of Winnipeg has been granted the power to
impose an LTT but has not done so. In the United
States, 35 states and the District of Columbia impose
some form of property transfer tax, along with many
municipalities. Indeed, in many US cities, property
sales are subject to both municipal and state taxes.1
Australian states levy a similar tax with rates up to
6.75 percent, while the UK LTT, called a ‘stamp duty
tax,’  ranges from 1 to 4 percent.2 Countries in
Southern Europe also rely on land transfer taxes. In
France, for example, the rate for residential property
was above 10 percent during the 1980s, but was
reduced to 4.8 percent in 1999.3
The City of Toronto Land Transfer Tax
In Ontario, as in most other provinces in Canada,
most municipalities are granted specified and
limited powers of taxation. The City of Toronto Act
(2006), which took effect on January 1, 2007,
authorized the City of Toronto to impose a number
of additional taxes. These newly available levies
included a land transfer tax, as well as taxes on
advertising, parking spaces, vehicle registrations,
amusement, alcohol and tobacco, and road tolls. 
The Toronto City Council first considered a land
transfer tax in July 2007 as a response to ongoing
revenue shortfalls – reported to be an expected $576
million for the 2008 fiscal year if no new revenue
sources were found. The City Council narrowly
defeated the implementation of an LTT on July 16,
2007; instead voting to defer a decision until October
2007. In response, the Mayor announced emergency
cuts to municipal services until additional revenue
could be found.4While it considered a number of
other possibilities beforehand, on October 22, 2007,
City Council ultimately approved an amended LTT,
with a more progressive rate structure and an
exemption for first-time buyers, to be implemented
on February 1, 2008.5The final rate schedule for
Toronto’s LTT is given in Table 1, along with the cor-
responding provincial tax rates.
The municipal LTT is expected to raise approx-
imately $155 million in 2008 and is projected to raise
$240 million once fully implemented (City of
Toronto 2008).6 Of this $240 million, on the basis of 
1 The highest such tax is in Philadelphia, where the maximum rate is 4 percent, with 3 percentage points going to the City of Philadelphia and 1 percent
going to the state. This tax is tied with Toronto’s as the highest combined rate in North America. 
2 In contrast to other LTTs, the marginal rate is applied to the entire value of the house rather than the value above a certain threshold. On August 2,
2008, the Brown government increased the threshold at which no stamp duty land tax applies from £ 125,000 GBP to £ 175,000. BBC News. August
2, 2008. “Stamp duty axed below £175,000.” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politics/7592852.stm
3 See Friggit (2003). 
4 See John Spears and Robyn Doolittle. “Libraries agree to cuts, but police defy mayor; But library board responds to mayor’s budget demands by
trimming $1.2 million.” Toronto Star, July 26, 2007, p. A.1.
5 Transactions with agreement of sale after January 1, 2008, and closing date before February 1, 2008, were exempt from the LTT. All transactions with
sale date before January 1, 2008, were exempt from the LTT regardless of whether the closing date was before or after February 1, 2008.
6 Municipal Land Transfer Tax (MLTT). Third Quarter 2008 Variance Report. Corporate Finance Division, City Hall. 
Table 1: City of Toronto and Province of Ontario Land Transfer Tax Rates
Note: For the municipal LTT, exemptions are given to first-time homebuyers for the value of a purchase under $400,000. For the provincial LTT, exemptions 
are given to first-time homebuyers for the value of a purchase under $227,500.
Sources: Municipal Land Transfer Tax, City of Toronto, http://www.toronto.ca/taxes/mltt.htm; Provincial Land Transfer Tax, Historical Land Transfer Tax Rates,
Province of Ontario.2007 sales, we project that $150 million will be raised
by sales of single-family residential properties. This is
not out of line with city estimates since some extra
revenue will be generated from condominium sales
and commercial properties.7The provincial LTT raised
approximately $1.4 billion in revenues in 2007/08, but
is expected to raise only $1.2 billion in 2008/09. 
Toronto’s adoption of the LTT as the primary
response to its budget deficit was uncertain until the
City Council actually approved the tax on October 22,
2007,  owing to the wide range of new taxes con-
sidered, the close margins on relevant City Council
votes and the negative public response to the tax.8This
fact will be important to our strategy for estimating the
effects of the LTT on real estate markets. 
Earlier Evaluations of Land Transfer Taxes
While LTTs appear to be quite common, there have
been few systematic efforts to measure their effects.
Existing studies include the following examples.
First, on the basis of fewer than 400 transactions,
Benjamin, Coulson and Yang (1993) found that real
estate prices fell considerably after an increase in the
Philadelphia Real Estate Transfer Tax. Second, a
study of the Toronto LTT commissioned by the
City of Toronto (Nowlan 2007) argued, from theo-
retical foundations and hypothetical estimates of the
demand and supply for housing, that the LTT
would have only a small impact on the Toronto real
estate market. Another study of an equivalent
European tax showed that an LTT-equivalent with
the same rate would decrease mobility by 8 to 19
percent (Van Ommeren and Van Leuvensteijn
2005).
Our study is based on a sample that records the
large majority of single-family home transactions in
the greater Toronto area for 25 months before the
imposition of the LTT and for the first seven
months afterward. Thus, we can reasonably hope to
arrive at definitive estimates of the LTT’s effects.
Measuring the Effect of the LTT 
on Volume
We first estimate the effect of the LTT on the volume
of real estate transactions. Our data describe the sale
of 139,266 single-family houses in the greater
Toronto area that were listed with the Multiple
Listing Service and sold between January 2006 and
August 2008.9 In particular, our study area includes
Toronto and all nearby municipalities: Mississauga,
Brampton, Vaughn, Richmond Hill, Markham and
Pickering. (A map of the study area is provided in the
Appendix.) These data are maintained by the Toronto
Real Estate Board and are estimated to reflect about
85 percent of all sales of single-family homes
(Hendel, Nevo and Ortalo-Magne 2008). For each
transaction we observe the sale price, the date when
the contract was signed, the date the transaction
closed, and the property’s postal code.
To determine whether a sale is subject to the LTT,
we first verify whether the property is in Toronto by
the postal code in the Multiple Listing Service dataset
(postal codes that start with the letter M). We use GIS
software to determine how far each postal code
centroid is from the Toronto border. Figure 2 presents
a map of a portion of the Toronto border along with
outlines of census tracts and postal codes. In this figure,
the Toronto border is a wide light gray line. Census
tract boundaries are medium-width lines in medium
gray. Postal code boundaries are thin black lines. Postal
code centroids are black points. In Toronto, postal
codes are typically one block along one side of a street
and thus very small. As can be seen from the scale bar
in the upper left, postal code centroids are generally
within a few hundred meters of a property, and are
often much closer. Thus, we can be confident that we
calculate properties’ locations accurately.
Conditional on a sale being in Toronto, we must
also determine whether the sale occurred before or
after the imposition of the LTT. Since we observe
the date on which the house is sold, this is straight-
forward. Any sale that was agreed on after January
7 We exclude condo sales and commercial properties from our analysis for numerous reasons. The main one is that for condo sales we have
information about the apartment but lack detailed building information. Furthermore, new units are usually sold directly by developers outside
the MLS – resulting in large gaps in condo market coverage. A very low share of commercial sales is included in the MLS data.
8 The city ultimately relied on a combination of revenues from the LTT, a property tax increase of 4.08 percent, a personal vehicle registration tax
and $200 million in provincial grants to meet the 2008 shortfall.
9 In fact, our data extend back to January 2003. However, since real estate markets in the years 2003-2005 may behave differently than those in the years
2006-2008, we do not rely on these data for our estimate of the effect of the LTT. The technical Appendix provides evidence to support this strategy. 
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10 The LTT contains a provision exempting first-time buyers from the LTT on the first $400,000 of a house. Since our measure of the LTT does not
identify the small number of buyers for whom this was relevant, our measure slightly overestimates the incidence of the LTT. 
1, 2008, and closed after Jan 31, 2008, is assumed
to be subject to the LTT.10
Method 1: Before and After
We now consider the problem of estimating the
effect of the LTT on the number of transactions in
Toronto in a typical month. 
The simplest strategy for calculating the effect of
the LTT is to compare real estate market volume in
Toronto before the imposition of the LTT with the
corresponding quantity after the imposition of the
LTT. We could calculate the effect of the LTT to be,
This is simply the difference between the number
of transactions before and after the LTT. The
volume of real estate transactions in Toronto and in
nearby suburbs was lower in 2008 than in 2007 (see
Figure 1). This suggests that comparing the Toronto
real estate market before and after the imposition of
the LTT will not produce a correct estimate of the
effect of the LTT. We should not ascribe a
downturn in the regional real estate market to a 
tax that applies only to Toronto.
Method 2: Toronto Versus the Surrounding Area
A second approach to measuring the effect of the
LTT considers only transactions that occur after the
imposition of the LTT, and compares the volume of
transactions in Toronto with the volume of
Fig 2
Toronto Border Census Tract Boundaries Postal Code Boundaries Postal Code Centroids
Figure 2: Locating Homes by Census Tract and Postal Code: A Portion of Toronto’s Northern Border
Sources: Statistics Canada Census Subdivision Reference Map; CanMap LDU Boundaries.
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suburban transactions. It estimates the effect of the
LTT on volume to be,
This estimate is correct if transaction volume is
not systematically higher (or lower) in Toronto than
in adjacent municipalities for some reason unrelated
to the LTT. For example, it seems likely that
Toronto suburbs have higher transaction volumes
than Toronto because the suburbs contain more
new houses or subdivisions. If so, then estimating
the effect of the LTT by comparing post-LTT
Toronto and suburban transaction volumes will
confound the intrinsically higher suburban
transaction volume with the effect of the LTT. This
leads us to suspect that this approach will under-
estimate the effect of the LTT. 
Method 3: Working with Time and Space
We next consider a “difference-in-differences”
estimate, which can correctly estimate the effect of
the LTT, even in the presence of time and spatial
trends in transaction volume. Specifically, we
calculate the change in the average monthly
transaction volume that occurs around the time of
the LTT; that is, the difference before and after the
introduction of the LTT, for Toronto and suburban
municipalities. We then calculate the difference-in-
differences estimate of the effect of the LTT as the
difference between the change in volume in Toronto
and the change in volume in suburban munici-
palities. More formally, the difference-in-difference
estimate of the effect of the LTT is,11
We estimate the effect of the LTT as the difference
between Toronto and suburban changes in volume
around the time of the imposition of the LTT. Since
this estimate is based on the difference in changes, it
is not affected by differences in levels between
Toronto and suburban municipalities, nor is it
affected by trends in the real estate market provided
they affect Toronto and suburban markets equally. 
However, the difference-in-differences estimate of
the effect of the LTT can be affected by time trends
in transaction volume that affect Toronto and
suburban municipalities unequally. In particular,
suppose that around the time that the LTT was
imposed, transaction volume fell faster in the suburbs
than in Toronto for some reason unrelated to the
LTT. This might occur, for example, if the suburbs
contained many buildable parcels early in our study
period, but were  “built-out” by late 2007. In this
case, we would observe a faster decline in the volume
of transactions in the suburbs that was unrelated to
the LTT. The difference-in-differences estimator
would confound this effect with the effect of the LTT
and thereby underestimate the effect of the LTT on
transaction volume. 
How to Precisely Evaluate the Effects 
of the LTT
We can overcome this problem by considering a
“spatially restricted difference-in-differences
estimate” of the effect of the LTT. This estimate is
identical to the difference-in-differences estimate,
but is based only on transactions that lie in a narrow
strip centered on the Toronto municipal border. As
we consider progressively narrower strips, we expect
areas on each side of the border to become more
homogeneous. The case for different trends becomes
correspondingly less plausible. More concretely, we
expect that areas in Toronto within three kilometers
of the border would be as likely to have a new 
subdivision as suburban areas within three
kilometers of the border.12
11 We note that the estimates that we present below actually use local “fixed-effects” rather than the difference-in-differences estimates. The two
techniques are intuitively very similar, although the actual formula is superficially different.
12 Decreasing the width of the band we consider increases the similarity of the houses under consideration, but decreases the number of sales that we
observe. The first effect increases the accuracy of our estimates, the second decreases it. Our choice of a three-km bandwidth appears to provide
the best tradeoff between these two effects.
Average transactions in Toronto after the LTT – 
Average transactions in Toronto before the LTT.
minus (
(
Average transactions in suburbs after the LTT – 
Average transactions in suburbs before the LTT. (
(
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13 We note that this estimate is a close cousin of the one that would be obtained by measuring the height of the discontinuity in transaction volumes
as plotted in the bottom panel of Figure 3.
14 In the jargon, we use a Poisson regression in place of the more standard “ordinary least squares” linear regression. 
15 We have a 95 percent confidence interval of 8 percent to 24 percent. The coefficient reported in the Appendix does not have an immediate inter-
pretation but allows us to calculate the effect of the LTT on transaction volume as reported in Table 2.
In light of the discussion above, our preferred
estimate for the effect of the LTT is the spatially
restricted difference-in-differences estimate.13 With
this said, four issues remain to be addressed. 
First, the spatially restricted difference-in-dif-
ferences estimate works by comparing changes in
the level of transaction volumes on either side of the
border at the time the LTT was imposed. If some
other change was imposed at the same time, then
the spatially restricted difference-in-differences
estimate would confound the effect of this other
event with that of the LTT. For example, if all
municipalities surrounding Toronto simultaneously
subsidized moving in January of 2008, then our
spatially restricted difference-in-differences estimate
would confound the effect of the subsidy on moving
with the effect of the LTT. However, we verified
that except for the LTT, there was no other such
major policy change by the City of Toronto or other
municipalities. Furthermore, property taxes in 
surrounding municipalities increased almost exactly
in line with those of the City of Toronto.
Second, there is the possibility that our spatially
restricted difference-in-differences estimate will
confound the effect of the LTT with some other,
unobserved and unrelated effect. In other words,
our estimate may identify a “spurious correlation.”
To see how this might happen, suppose that for
some reason all real estate transactions in Toronto
(but not the suburbs) take place in the last four
months of the year. Then, since our data record only
the first eight months of 2008, and this corresponds
closely to the imposition of the LTT, our spatially
restricted difference-in-differences estimate may
confound this seasonal variation with the effect of
the LTT. To overcome this particular problem, we
control for seasonal effects in our estimates. 
Third, it is important to note that the imposition
of the LTT was relatively sudden and could not have
been anticipated, so that the real estate market did
not have much time to anticipate the LTT. While
there is some evidence that the market was particu-
larly active during the time between City Council’s
approval of the LTT and its implementation, from
October 22, 2007, to February 1, 2008, we are able
to control for this effect in our estimations. Moreover,
we can be confident that real estate markets prior to
October 2007 did not respond to the LTT. Thus,
when we compare market behavior for February
through August of 2007 with the corresponding
months of 2008, we can be confident of capturing
the entire effect of the LTT. 
Fourth and finally, we use estimation techniques
that reflect the fact that our data are not continuous;
that is, for each postal code we record an integer
number of transactions, not a continuum. To reflect
this feature of our data, we conduct a regression that
is tailored for this specific type of data rather than
the more common methods.14 With this said, sup-
plemental results presented in the technical
Appendix indicate that our estimate of the effect of
the LTT on transaction volume is not sensitive to
this choice of technique. 
Table 2 presents our preferred estimate of the
effect of the LTT. Our dependent variable is the
number of single-family homes sold in each month
in each postal code located within three kilometers
of the Toronto border. The quantity of interest is the
mean change in the number of transactions that
occurs in a postal code. In addition to the LTT
indicator variable we include monthly indicator
variables and postal code fixed effects. 
This calculation shows that the imposition of 
the LTT reduced sales by 16 percent and this
estimate is different from zero with 99 percent
confidence.15 While we do not describe it here, we
experimented extensively with variants of this
estimation strategy. Controlling for mean housing
characteristics, controlling for particularly high
sales in Toronto in the three months prior to the
LTT, and considering different widths of border or
geographic units of observation does not affect our
results. The Appendix provides details.
We focus our attention on a narrow band around
the Toronto border to reduce the possibility that our
estimate of the causal effect of the LTT is con-16 To put the distances into context, moving from south to north along Yonge St, the far left hand of the graph would start at Eglinton Avenue and
would run north into Richmond Hill.
founded with other factors. However, this does not
mean that our estimate of the effect should be
understood as applying only to this narrow band. 
To the contrary, since we have been careful to isolate
the causal effect of the Toronto LTT, we expect this
effect will be much the same anywhere in Toronto,
or in other similar real estate markets.
In particular, we can use the estimated effect 
of the LTT to estimate, in turn, the number of
Toronto households that choose not to move
because of the LTT in a typical year. This cal-
culation is straightforward. The average annual
number of transactions recorded in our data for
2004-2006 is about 21,200 for Toronto.
Multiplying 21,200 by the estimated 16 percent
effect of the LTT gives us a decrease of about 3,500
in the number of single-family homes sold in an
average year in Toronto. To the extent that the MLS
does not reflect all single-family home sales, this
estimate understates the decline in sales caused by
the LTT. Since we have excluded the sales of condo-
miniums from our analysis, it also does not reflect
the effect of the LTT on condominium sales.
It is worth noting that the effect of the LTT may
also be seen in the market data for larger band-
widths from the border. The top two panels of
Figure 3 describe the average number of transactions
as the distance from the Toronto border increases 
to 10 kilometres.16 In Figure 3, zero on the x-axis
represents the Toronto border. Points to the left of
zero are in the City of Toronto and points to the
right are in the suburbs. The grey lines in the top
panel of Figure 3 describe average monthly trans-
actions between February and August 2007. The
black lines present transaction volumes for February
through August 2008, the first seven months after the
imposition of the LTT. The bottom panel describes
the average year-over-year percentage change in
transaction volume around the border. It is clear from
these figures that real estate markets responded to the
LTT in a way that is consistent with our estimations.
In particular, market volume dropped much more
dramatically in Toronto than in surrounding suburbs. 
The Cost of Lost Mobility
We have seen that the LTT results in decreases in
mobility for Toronto residents. To illustrate the
linkage between the LTT and mobility, consider a
single-family home whose owners value their
friendships in the neighborhood, along with, say,
proximity to parks, school, work, or family. Now
consider a potential buyer who would like to move
into a particular house. To induce the current
resident to move, the prospective buyer must pay
enough to allow the current resident to buy a com-
parable house somewhere else and compensate them
for the loss of neighborhood attachments. 
Now consider a market with thousands of such
potential buyers and sellers on each side. Residents
differ in how they value their attachments to their
neighborhood. Some people place little value on
their neighborhood, while others will need sig-
nificant compensation to leave. By ranking potential
sellers according to the amount of money they
require before they are willing to move we can
construct a conventional supply curve for neigh-
borhood houses. Likewise, some buyers would pay
large sums to move into a given neighborhood if
| 8 Commentary 277
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Effect on Number of Transactions 
Percent change in transactions due to LTT (per postal code per month) -16***
Reduction in number of transactions 3,496
Table 2: The Effect of the LTT on Transactions Within Three Kilometres of the Border of Toronto
***Significant at 99% level of confidence. Coefficients reported in Appendix.
Sources: Multiple Listing Service; authors’ calculations.Commentary 277 | 9
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City of Toronto Surrounding suburbs
Figure 3: The Effect of the Land Transfer Tax on Transactions Within 10 Kilometres of the Toronto Border





















































City of Toronto Surrounding suburbs
Notes: Zero on the x-axis is the border of the City of Toronto, points to the left of zero are in the City of Toronto and points to the right are in the surrounding
suburban municipalities. Transactions are counted within bands of land measuring 40 metres in width and extending around the border of the city. The
grey line in the top panel shows mean transaction volume as a function of distance from the Toronto border for February through August 2007. The black
line shows mean transaction volume for February through August of 2008, the first seven months of Toronto's LTT. The bottom panel describes the
average year-over-year change in transaction volume around the border.
Sources: Multiple Listing Service; authors’ calculations.
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g
Foregone Transactions Caused by LTT
Demand
Supply
Figure 4: Supply and Demand Curve for a Group of Houses in a Neighbourhood
Notes: The area of the shaded triangle gives the value of forgone transactions caused by the LTT. P* is price before LTT. V* is volume before LTT. P
LTT is sale
price after LTT. P
LTT + LTT is purchase cost after LTT. V
LTT is volume after LTT.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
they highly value something in that neighborhood
(good schools, for example), while others may not
value that same area very highly. Ranking potential
buyers according to their willingness to pay gives
rise to a demand curve for neighborhood houses.
Figure 4 plots these supply and demand curves.
The market price will adjust so that the number of
buyers exactly equals the number of sellers for the
number of sales, V*, with a price, P*. 
With the imposition of an LTT on housing sales,
a prospective buyer must not only induce the
current resident to leave, but must also pay the LTT.
This opens a gap between what the buyer pays and
what the seller receives. Hence, sellers who would
have been willing to move only at the original sale
price without the LTT, will no longer be willing to
move. Thus, the introduction of the tax prevents the
movement of prospective buyers who would value a
house in a neighborhood more than the current
residents do. In this case, the number of buyers will
equal the number of sellers, V
LTT, at a lower price
received by sellers, P
LTT, but at a higher cost to
buyers at price P
LTT+LTT. 
How Much Does This Cost Residents?
When a transaction that would have otherwise
occurred is prevented because of a tax, there is an
economic cost. While Figure 4 formalizes our
intuition about how the LTT leads to a decrease in
the transaction volume, it also provides a basis for
measuring the economic cost of this lost mobility.
When a house is sold by a seller willing to accept
less than what the buyer is willing to pay, and the
price is intermediate between these two values, then
both are made better off. The magnitude of this
welfare gain is simply the vertical distance between
the supply and demand curves. If we sum the gains
from trade for all transactions forgone because of
the LTT – those between V
LTT and V* – the area of
the shaded triangle in Figure 4 gives us the dollar
value of trades forgone because of the LTT.17
17 Since we know that the base of this triangle is simply the magnitude of the land transfer tax, and the height is the number of forgone transactions,
we can calculate the area of this triangle, and hence the value of forgone mobility caused by the LTT. The area of this triangle is one half the length
of its base, in this case the magnitude of the LTT, times its height, in this case V* – V
LTT.Commentary 277 | 11
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The number of forgone transactions due to the
LTT is about 3,500, while the average LTT paid in
our sample is $6,712. Using these two estimates, we
calculate the value of lost mobility caused by the
LTT at about $11.7 million per year.18  Since the
LTT raised approximately $150 million from the
transactions observed in our sample, this means that
the LTT imposes $1 in economic costs due to lost
mobility for every $13 of revenue collected.19
In fact, real estate transactions in Toronto are
subject to a provincial LTT as well as the Toronto
LLT. The Appendix generalizes the analysis developed
here to allow for both taxes. This analysis shows
that, given the pre-existing Ontario LTT, the cost of
lost mobility caused by the Toronto LTT is about
three times as large as the estimate here (Dahlby 
and Wilson 2003). 
Measuring the Effects of the LTT 
on Prices
We estimate that the average amount of LTT paid 
is about 1.1 percent of the sale price of the average
house. Given this, we expect the LTT to have an
impact on house prices of about the same
magnitude. Consistent with this, an inspection of
Figure 1b or Figure 5 suggests that the effect of the
LTT on prices will be small. Measuring so small an
effect accurately is difficult, even with our high-
quality data.
Our strategy for estimating the effect of the 
LTT on the price of single-family homes is much
the same as the one we employed to estimate the
effect of the LTT on the number of sales; that is, 
we use a spatially restricted difference-in-differences
estimate.20 More specifically, for a three-km band
around the Toronto border we calculate the effect 
of the LTT on prices as, 
The Appendix provides the details of our
econometric technique, and discusses supplemental
results and robustness tests. Our units of
observation are individual transactions that occurred
between January 2006 and August 2008 within
three km of the Toronto border. The quantity of
interest is the mean change in the average price of a
Toronto house after the imposition of the LTT.
Finally, to reduce the possibility that our estimate of
the effect of the LTT reflects a spurious correlation,
we include controls for month of year, house char-
acteristics, and allow for a separate trend in Toronto.
(See Table 3.) 
The results of our estimation indicate that the
effect of the LTT on prices is -1.5 percent.21 In alter-
native specifications, we obtain point estimates that
are consistently negative and as large as a 2.6 percent
drop.22The Appendix provides technical details. 
The initial drop in prices (-1.5 percent) is, in fact,
more than the average rate of the LTT (-1.1
percent). This difference is not statistically sig-
nificant but it is suggestive. The likely reason for this
is that the current price of real estate not only
embodies the reduction in the first sale after the
introduction of the LTT, but also the sales after that.
Buyers recognize that when they sell their house,
they too will have to sell their home at a lower price
than what the next buyer might be willing to pay. 
Consistent with the results above, the top panel
of Figure 5 shows prices around the Toronto border
for February through August of 2007 (the black
18 Since we observe the first eight months of 2008, we calculate the average LTT payment by applying the LTT payment formula to all 2007 sales in
Toronto. 
19 Again, since we do not have information for all of 2008, this estimate is based on all 2007 sales. 
20 The estimation of the LTT’s effect on price does slightly differ from the problem of estimating the effect of the LTT on volume. Unlike our
volume data for which every observation is a small integer, our price data can take a large range of values from a few thousand dollars to millions
of dollars. Thus, we use the linear model to estimate the effects of the LTT on price. As with the sales volume regression, we employ geographic
area fixed effects to implement the difference-in-differences method.
21 We estimate a 95 percent confidence interval of -0.3 percent to -2.8 percent
22 However, some of these alternative estimates are not statistically significant because of the small size of this price effect. 
Average price in Toronto after the LTT – 
Average price in Toronto before the LTT.
minus (
(
Average price in suburbs after the LTT – 
Average price in suburbs before the LTT. (
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line), and for the corresponding period in 2008 (the
grey line). The graph is similar to Figure 3. Prices
are slightly higher within the City of Toronto than
outside and marginally higher in 2008 than 2007.
The bottom panel shows the year-over-year change
in price as a percent of the 2007 level. We see a
distinct drop in the price of houses in Toronto
relative to neighboring suburban houses. This drop
appears to be at most a few percent. 
The effect of the LTT also varies by the value of
the house. Houses below the Toronto-average house
value of $400,000 had the largest reduction in
transaction volume, with a fall of 36 percent. By
comparison, houses above $400,000 saw a
reduction in transaction volume of 7 percent, which
is small enough that we cannot be certain that it is
different from zero (Table 4). The opposite is true of
prices. Houses below $400,000 saw a negligible fall
in prices while more expensive homes saw a
reduction on the order of 2.2 percent. 
An Assessment of the LTT
In 2007, the City of Toronto raised $1.9 billion in
residential property taxes. Based on our estimates
above from 2007 sales, we expect the LTT to raise
$150 million from MLS-listed single-family house
sales (excluding condominiums and commercial
properties) for the City once fully implemented in
2009. To replace that revenue with a residential
property tax increase would require a property tax
increase of about 8 percent. 
An ordinary property tax is payable by whoever
owns the property. Thus, regardless of whether the
property owner moves, the tax on the property is
the same. With a land transfer tax, the tax is paid
only when the property changes hands. Hence, the
LTT provides a disincentive to moving relative to an
ordinary property tax. 
We have now estimated the number of forgone
real estate transactions that result from Toronto’s
LTT and the value of this lost mobility. Since there
is no loss of mobility under the ordinary property
Effect on Sale Price 
Percent change in prices due to LTT  -1.5**
Average reduction in sale price $6,397
Table 3: The Effect of the LTT on House Sale Prices
**Significant at 95% level of confidence. Using logarithm of price. Other controls: month, house characteristics, time trend for City of Toronto. Coefficient
reported in Appendix.
Sources: Multiple Listing Service; authors’ calculations.
House Value <$400,000 >$400,000
Percent change in transactions due to LTT  -36*** -7
Percent change in prices due to LTT  -0.5 -2.2***
Table 4: The Effect of the LTT on Transactions and Price by House Value 
***Significant at 99% level of confidence. Coefficients reported in Appendix.
Sources: Multiple Listing Service; authors’ calculations.Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
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City of Toronto Surrounding suburbs
B. Change in Sale Price (year-over-year)
Note: Zero on the x-axis is the border of the City of Toronto, points to the left of zero are in the City of Toronto and points to the right are in the surrounding
municipalities. The grey line in top panel shows the average sale price as a function of distance from the Toronto border for February through August 
2008, the first seven months of Toronto's LTT. The solid line shows average price for February through August of 2007. The bottom panel describes the
average year-over-year change in prices around the border.
Sources: Multiple Listing Service; authors’ calculations.tax, increasing reliance on it and reducing reliance
on the LTT, could cut the cost of funding the
Toronto city government by at least the value of the
lost mobility. 
While this clearly argues in favor of reducing
Toronto’s reliance on the LTT, there are also three
other problems with the LTT that do not arise
under an ordinary property tax. First, as with the
provincial LTT, the municipal LTT can either be
filed electronically through Teranet, or in paper
format with an affidavit. To file the LTT elec-
tronically, one must purchase proprietary Teranet
software, which costs at least $595 for a single user.
In addition to the costs of software and the time
spent by lawyers to file the tax, Teranet charges a fee
to collect the LTT revenues.23The size of this fee
has not been publicly disclosed, but can be
estimated by looking at the fees that Teranet charges
for other services, such as property searches and land
registration. Teranet’s fee for land registration is
currently set between $10 and $20, depending on
the type of transaction. It is reasonable to expect
that the fee for processing an LTT payment would
be of the same order of magnitude.24 If the city relied
on an ordinary property tax with its pre-existing col-
lection infrastructure, then these administrative
costs would be avoided. 
Second, the province of Ontario also collects a
land transfer tax on property sales in Toronto. Since
the Toronto LTT drives down transaction price and
volume, it also drives down the tax revenue collected
by the provincial LTT. These forgone provincial
revenues result in reduced provincial services or in
an increase in some other provincial tax. We
estimate the decrease in provincial LTT revenue
caused by the Toronto LTT at about $25 million.25
Thus, the Toronto LTT reduces provincial LTT
revenue by about  $1 for every $6 raised by the City.
While an ordinary property tax will affect sales
prices in about the same way as an LTT, it will not
affect sales volume. Thus, we expect the effect of an
ordinary property tax on provincial LTT revenue to
be smaller than that of a municipal LTT.
Third, an ordinary property tax is paid by all
property owners in the city. An LTT, in contrast, is
paid only by property purchasers. In 2006, there
were 666,678 assessed residential and commercial
properties, while there were 56,227 property trans-
actions of all types (Nowlan 2007). In other words,
the LTT places the burden of funding municipal
services consumed by the bulk of property owners
on only a small subset of the population. Thus, the
LTT appears to be less consistent with ordinary
notions of fairness than is an ordinary property tax.
Fourth, the revenue generated by an LTT appears
to be more difficult to predict than the revenue
generated by an ordinary property tax. Provincial
LTT revenues grew by 14 percent over the previous
year in the 2007/08 budget but fell by 15 percent in
the next budget.26 Likewise, land transfer taxes were
a volatile source of revenue for all cities across
Canada, having grown by 22 percent from 2003 to
2004, only to fall by 21 percent just two years later,
between 2005 and 2006. In the US, Florida transfer
tax revenues fell by half between 2005/06 and
2007/08. San Francisco transfer tax revenues fell by
32 percent from 1999/2000 to 2001/2002 during
the dot-com crash.27 By relying on an LTT rather
than an ordinary property tax, Toronto is probably
increasing the variability of revenues, and thus
increasing the difficulty of formulating city budgets. 
Finally, while the LTT is nominally paid by the
purchaser, we have seen that the LTT has led to a
decrease in average sale price of about the same
magnitude as the LTT exaction. Thus, the buyer’s
after-tax price is nearly unchanged by the LTT.
While it is the buyer who writes the check, it is the
seller who is poorer. This has two implications. First,
23 Teranet is a former provincially owned corporation.
24 See “Teraview 5.4 pricing: software” available online at www.teraview.ca. In their 2008 2nd quarter report Teranet reported a 48 percent increase
in “other value-added services” (of which Toronto LTT collection revenues are one part) in the first six months of 2008 compared to the first six
months of 2007.
25 To make this calculation, we sum (1) the average amount of provincial LTT on a transaction multiplied by the number of forgone transactions,
with (2) the decreased provincial LTT revenue that results from lower sale prices. See the Appendix for a full discussion of the interaction between
the provincial LTT and the Toronto LTT.
26 This excludes Ontario electricity payments in-lieu-of-taxes, which are projected to raise $600 million for the province compared to $1.1 billion
from the provincial LTT (2008 Ontario Economic Outlook and Fiscal Review). 
27 State of Florida, Department of Revenue, Revenue Collection Report, Office of Tax Research. June 2008 & FY 07/08 Summary.
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all, or nearly all, of the burden of the LTT is born
by current Toronto residents. While there are some
taxes, for example a toll on highways used by
commuters, which might allow Toronto to fund its
city government at the expense of non-residents, the
LTT is not one of them. In this regard, an ordinary
property tax and an LTT are the same. 
Conclusion
The LTT caused a large decrease in the volume of
real estate transactions in Toronto. By our estimate,
the LTT will cause about 3,500 families per year to
stay in houses that are too small, too big, or too far
from their places of work or school. Unlike the LTT,
an ordinary property tax does not provide a disin-
centive for moving. This means that a property tax
that collected the same amount of revenue as the
current LTT would leave Toronto residents better
off. While Torontonians would pay the same
amount of tax on average, they would do it in
houses that suit them better. While it is difficult to
assign a dollar value to the lost mobility resulting
from the Toronto’s LTT, our estimates suggest that
for every $13 of revenue that the LTT collects, it
imposes at least $1 of such extra costs. In addition,
the LTT involves other costs and side effects not
seen with a property tax.
Our data also suggest that the LTT has caused
about a 1.5 percent decline in the average sale price
of a single-family home in Toronto. This is what we
would have expected from a property tax raising a
similar amount of revenue, so that an LTT affects
residential real estate prices in about the same way as
an ordinary property tax. 
Funding the municipal government with an LTT
has no apparent advantage over an ordinary
property tax. The disadvantages of the LTT relative
to an ordinary property tax include: millions of
dollars per year in lost mobility, substantial
additional administrative costs, a seemingly unfair
reliance on a small tax base, and increased variance
in municipal revenue. Therefore, our data and
analysis suggest that reducing Toronto’s dependence
on the LTT is desirable. Since the Ontario LTT is
similar to Toronto’s LTT, our data also suggest that
reducing the provincial dependence on this tax is
also desirable. C.D. Howe Institute
STUDY AREA: Our study area is the City of
Toronto and the immediately surrounding
municipalities of Mississauga, Brampton,
Vaughn, Richmond Hill, Markham and
Pickering. (See Figure A1).
TRANSACTION VOLUME ESTIMATIONS: Our unit
of observation is a postal code month within
three kilometers of the Toronto border for each
month between January 2006 and August 2008.
Our dependent variable is the number of single-
family homes sold. The quantity of interest is the
mean change in the number of transactions that
occurs in a Toronto postal code after the
imposition of the LTT. To reflect the discrete
nature of our data we use a Poisson regression
specification rather than the more standard
linear model. To implement the difference-in-
differences estimate, we employ postal code fixed
effects. Finally, to reduce the possibility that our
estimate of the effect of the LTT reflects a
spurious correlation, we include controls for
month of year. Thus, our estimating equation is, 
Table A1 presents the estimation result
presented in the text, along with supplemental
estimates. 
Column 1 presents our preferred specification.
This is a Poisson regression with the unit of
observation the number of sales within three
kilometers of the Toronto border in each postal
code in each month between January 2006 and
Appendix 1
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City of Toronto and Surrounding Suburbs Figure A1:
Source: Statistics Canada Census Subdivision Reference Map.
Postal code transactions in each month=
f (LTT, Month of Year, postal code)
where f is the Poisson density. Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
August 2008. The variable of interest is an LTT
indicator variable, which takes the value one for
transactions subject to the LTT and zero
otherwise. In addition to the LTT indicator
variable, we include monthly indicator variables
and postal code fixed effects. In column 1 – our
preferred specification – the coefficient of the
LTT indicator is negative and significantly
different from zero at the 5 percent level. 
While the Poisson estimator is well suited to
predicting count data of the sort we employ
here, the resulting coefficients are difficult to
interpret. To assess the magnitude of our
estimated effect, we calculate the predicted
number of sales for all postal codes months
subject to the LTT and then calculate the
predicted number of sales for these postal codes
in the counterfactual case when the LTT is not
in effect. Our estimate of the effect of the LTT is
the mean, over all postal code months, of the dif-
ference between these two quantities. This
estimate of the effect of the LTT is given in the
last row of Table A1. We calculate the confidence
bounds reported in the main text in a similar
fashion, but use confidence bounds for the LTT
parameter estimate instead of the point estimate.
Columns 2 through 6 check the robustness of
our estimate and columns 7 and 8 present results
by house value. In column 2, we add several
variables describing mean house characteristics by
postal code to the specification of column 1. In
column 3, we add an indicator variable that is one
for Toronto postal codes in the last three months
of 2007. In column 4, we use a larger spatial unit
of observation, the census tract a house is in,
rather than the postal code. In column 5, we
consider transactions that lie within five
kilometers of the Toronto border rather than
three. In column 6, we use an OLS specification
rather than Poisson. In every case, our results are
close to those of column 1. Column 7 presents
results using the main specification for house
values under $400,000 and column 8 repeats this
but for houses above $400,000.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
LTT -0.15*** -0.16*** -0.13*** -0.11*** -0.19*** -0.01*** -0.31*** -0.07
Standard error (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.002) (0.06) (0.05)
Month indicator Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
House characteristics N Y N N N N N N
Indicator for Q4 2007 N N Y N N N N N
Distance threshold 3km 3 km 3km 3km 5km 3km 3km 3km
Geographical Postal Postal Postal Census Postal Postal Postal Postal
unit code code code tract code code code code
Specification Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson Poisson OLS Poisson Poisson
Houses All All All All All All <$400,000 >$400,00
Observations 226,995 226,978 226,995 6,705 385,188 297,174 107,645 130,462
Percent Effect of LTT -16 -17 14 -11 -21 -21 -37 -7
The Effect of the LTT on the Number of Transactions
Note. Level of significance, *** p<0.01.
Sources: Multiple Listing Service; authors’ calculations.
Table A1
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SALES PRICE ESTIMATIONS: Our unit of
observation is an individual transaction that
occurred between January 2006 and August
2008 within three km of the Toronto border. 
We use a standard OLS regression and our
dependent variable is the logarithm of the sale
price. The quantity of interest is the mean
change in price of a Toronto house after the
imposition of the LTT. To implement the dif-
ference-in-differences estimate, we employ postal
code fixed effects. Finally, to reduce the pos-
sibility that our estimate of the effect of the LTT
reflects a spurious correlation, we include
controls for month of year, house characteristics,
and allow for a separate trend in Toronto. Thus,
our estimating equation is, 
Table A2 presents the estimation of the effect
of the LTT on sales price given in the text, along
with five supplemental estimations. All are based
on transaction level data and use the logarithm
of sale price for all transactions within three km
of the border as the dependent variable. 
In our preferred estimation, presented in
column 1, we regress log price on: an indicator
which is set to one if the transaction is subject to
the LTT; indicator variables for each month to
reflect seasonal and yearly changes to prices
unrelated to the LTT; a Toronto specific trend,
to control for the divergence in the prices of
Toronto and suburban homes (this divergence is
just barely visible in Figure 5); and an extensive
list of house characteristics (binary variables
describing: heating; garage; basement; whether
the house is attached; number of stories; con-
struction type; the presence of a family room;
and fireplace, along with counts of: bedrooms;
bathrooms; kitchens; rooms: parking spaces:
square feet and lot size.) We see that the coef-
ficient on LTT in this regression is -0.015 and
that this coefficient is statistically different from
Log(sale price) = A + B(LTT) + C(Month of Year) +
D(Toronto trend) + 
E(House characteristics) + 
(Postal code indicators).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
LTT -0.015** -0.007 -0.026*** -0.012* -0.021*** -0.002 -0.005 -0.022***
Standard error (-0.006) (-0.004) (-0.009) (-0.007) (-0.005) (-0.007) (-0.08) (-0.01)
Month indicator Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
House characteristics Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y
Indicator for fourth 
quarter 2007 N N N Y N N N N
Distance threshold 3km 3km 3km 3km 5km 3km 3km 3km
Geographical Postal Postal Postal Postal Postal Census Postal Postal
unit code code code code code Tract code code
Toronto trend Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Houses All All All All All All <$400,000 >$400,000
Observations 19,783 19,783 19,785 19,783 32,994 19,783 11,227 8,556
The Effect of the LTT on House Sale Prices log (logarithm)
Note: Level of significance, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
Sources: Multiple Listing Service; authors’ calculations.
Table A2Commentary 277 | 19
Independent ￿ Reasoned ￿ Relevant C.D. Howe Institute 
zero with a high level of confidence. Since the
dependent variable is the logarithm of price, to
assess the magnitude of this effect, we note that
the sample mean price is about $430,000. The
logarithm of this price is 12.97. If we subtract
the LTT effect, this gives a log price of 12.96.
Exponentiation gives a post LTT price of
$425,000, a decrease of about 1.5 percent.
Column 2 of Table A2 duplicates the
regression of column 1, but omits the Toronto
trend. As a consequence of this change, the
estimated effect drops to close to zero and is not
distinguishable from zero. This suggests that the
LTT has affected prices by stopping the
divergence of Toronto and suburban prices.
Column 3 duplicates the regression of column 1,
but drops the controls for housing charac-
teristics. This leads to an increase in the
coefficient of the LTT indicator, but a decrease
in its significance. This suggests that housing
characteristics are correlated with the LTT
indicator. Column 4 duplicates the regression of
column 1, but includes an indicator for sales that
occurred in Toronto during the run up to the
imposition of the LTT. Column 5 duplicates
column 1, but extends attention to a five-km
band around the border rather than  three km.
This increases our sample size, but does not
affect the magnitude of the LTT effect, although
it increases the accuracy with which we estimate
this effect slightly. Column 6 duplicates the
regression of column 1 but the level of
geography used is the census tract rather than
postal codes. The use of broader geographical
units lowers the coefficient on prices and makes
it insignificant. Column 7 presents results using
the main specification for house values under
$400,000 and column 8 repeats this houses
above $400,000.
In all, Table A2 suggests that the LTT has had
a small negative effect on the price of single-
family homes in Toronto. 
TAX INTERACTION EFFECTS: We here extend our
analysis of the costs of the LTT to reflect the fact
that Toronto residents are subject to a pre-
existing provincial LTT. This analysis suggests
that the cost of lost mobility associated with the
Toronto LTT is about three times as large as the
estimate developed in the main text. 
Figure A1 is based on Figure 4, but illustrates
a real estate market equilibrium where the
market is subject first to a provincial LTT and
then to an identical Toronto LTT. The starting
point is the Ontario Land Transfer Tax, LTTONT.
With this tax in place, the volume of sales is V1
and the price of a property is P1. If we ignore the
interaction of the Ontario LTT with the rest of
the federal, provincial, and municipal tax system,
then the excess burden of the LTTONT is the 
light shaded area.
Introducing the LTTTO doubles the total land
transfer tax rate. This causes the volume of trans-
actions to drop to V2 and the price of a property
to decline to P2. Measured in the usual way, the
total deadweight loss of the tax system is now the
larger dark shaded area, in addition to the
original light shaded area. The excess burden
from the LTTTO is much larger than the original
excess burden, the light-shaded area. 
If the marginal effect on volume of the two
taxes is the same then the deadweight loss of the
second LTT when there is a pre-existing LTT is
about three times as large as when there is no
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